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Abstract 
As the use of social platforms continues to evolve, in areas such as cyber-security and 
defence, it has become imperative to develop adaptive methods for tracking, identifying and 
investigating cyber-related activities on these platforms. This paper introduces a new 
approach for detecting “cyber-related” discussions in online social platforms using a 
candidate set of terms that are representative of the cyber domain. The objective of this paper 
is to create a cyber lexicon with cyber-related terms that is applicable to the automatic 
detection of cyber activities across various online platforms. The method presented in this 
paper applies natural language processing techniques to representative data from multiple 
social platform types such as Reddit, Stack overflow, twitter and cyberwar news to extract 
candidate terms for a generic cyber lexicon. In selecting the candidate terms, we introduce 
the APMIS Aggregated Pointwise Mutual Information Score in comparison with the Term 
Frequency-Term Degree Ratio (FDR Score) and Term Frequency-Inverse Document 
Frequency Score (TF-IDF Score).  These scoring mechanisms are robust to account for term 
frequency, term relevance and mutual dependence between terms. Finally, we evaluate the 
performance of the cyber lexicon by measuring its precision of in classifying discussions as 
'Cyber-Related' or 'Non-Cyber-Related'. 
This paper theoretically provides a methodology for creating custom cyber-related lexicons 
that capture specific domains of analytical interest. The results presented are most applicable 
to cyber threat monitoring and detection of malicious cyber activities in online social 
platforms. 
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Introduction 
The evolution of the World Wide Web provides new methods for communication in the 
hyper-connected world. These communications include sharing of texts, images and videos 
between geographically distributed cyber-personas. Security experts usually apply manual 
techniques for monitoring and detecting cyber-related activities on social platforms. 
However, given the ever-increasing volume of data generated on these social platforms, these 
manual techniques have become labour intensive, inefficient, and a significant challenge for 
security experts who hope to stay ahead. 
The volume of text data currently generated daily online and the resultant exponential 
increase in the number of potential cyber-related activities requires robust techniques in 
analytics to identify cyber threats for early mitigation.  One such technique is Natural 
Language processing of text data.  Natural Language Processing (NLP) is rooted in many 
disciplines, such as computer science and computational linguistics. It is yet another branch 
of Artificial Intelligence (AI) which gives computers a better understanding of, interpretation 
of, as well as the ability to manipulate human language [1], [2]. The primary aim of NLP is a 
step towards bridging the communication gap between human and machine.  
Language processing techniques that support cyber situational awareness on the social 
dimension of cyberspace need more domain-specific lexicon than what is available today. For 
example, several studies and historical events have demonstrated the ability of individuals 
and groups to use social platforms as enablers for perpetrating cyber-incidents [3]–[5]. In 
July 2006, the hacker group anonymous recruited new members, planned, organised and 
facilitated the famous raid on Habbo Hotel using the 4chan microblogging platform [6], [7]. 
Similarly, between 2008 and 2012 the hacker groups Anonymous and its spin-off LulzSec 
used social chat rooms to recruit, train new hackers, plan and coordinate cyber-attacks with 
hashtag trends such as #Operation Payback [8], [9]. Furthermore, in popular and open social 
platforms like Twitter, the use of trending hashtags such as #OpLibtard, #OpISIS, #OpPedos, 
#OpIsreal are open tags for tracking discussions related to certain cyber-activities being 
carried out. A gap exists in automatically spotting these sort of conversations on these 
platforms, given the volume of data generated. 
This paper addresses this gap by providing a methodology for automatically identifying 
cyber-related discussions in online social platforms. The goal is to create a simple method for 
monitoring conversations on social platforms and detecting texts that are related to cyber 
activities. We aim to develop a generic lexicon of candidate terms that capture the context of 
analytical interest. We achieve this by creating a representative corpus of cyber-related 
discussions using data from popular cyber microblogging platforms such as Reddit, Twitter, 
stack overflow, hacker news and cyberwar news. We build a lexicon of cyber-related or 
context-specific terms that are known to appear frequently with a higher degree of relevance 
to the context of analysis, in these discussions. We rank each term based on scoring 
mechanisms that emphasise the frequency of term occurrence, the relevance of terms in 
sentences and the mutual dependence amongst terms. To evaluate the performance of the 
lexicon, we apply it to a ‘cyber-related’ quantification task on a set of new labelled (Cyber-
related and Non-cyber-related) discussions from a collection of social platforms. A 
quantification algorithm estimates the degree of ‘cyber-relatedness’ of random text and 
classifies each text into one of two classes – Cyber-related or Non-Cyber-Related -- based on 
an optimally selected threshold. Given the increased cost of deploying cyber mitigation 
strategies and a low tolerance for false positives, we focus on maximising the classification 
precision of the lexicon. We compare the performance of each scoring mechanism in 
maximising classification precision. The aggregated pointwise information score (APMIS)  
is seen to return a higher prediction precision alongside a lower false positive rate.  
The main contributions of this paper are of two folds; firstly, it presents a novel approach for 
building a cyber domain-specific lexicon and offers a curated list of context-specific terms 
that are representative of the cyber domain. The lexicon contributes to already existing 
methods for monitoring and detecting cyber-related activities on social platforms [10]–[12]. 
Mining Social Platforms for Cyber-Related Discussions 
The first challenge in building a lexicon in the context of the cyber domain is to generate a 
representative set of “cyber-related” discussions from these social platforms. Any strategy for 
gathering such information must include relevant texts from the appropriate social channels. 
Social media platforms are characterised by the type of content generated, user experience 
and policies that guide interactions on these platforms [13]. To accurately identify all kinds of 
sources of relevant data, we define three types of social platforms based on the level of 
moderation of user-generated content [14].  
The categorisation of Social Platforms 
The level of moderation of user content is crucial as it defines the manner of conversations 
happening on a social platform. We observe such categorisation from the degree to which 
users can freely express their views on these platforms (unhindered) and therefore, the extent 
to which they can use them for personal activities. 
 Pre-Moderated Social Platforms: Administrators of these platforms highly moderate 
user-generated content before it appears online. Pre-moderation ensures that posts 
generated by users but deemed “inappropriate” by site administrators never make it 
online. These sites do not allow users to create personalised topics for discussions but 
rather, contribute to topic categories created by the site administrators. Therefore, 
these types of social platforms have highly regulated topic forums where users can 
participate. Additionally, due to the need for highly regulated online communications 
on these platforms, discussions do not occur in real-time. While these platforms are 
useful for controlling inappropriate use and stamping out cybercrimes, such rules 
have been known to lead to the death of online communities [14].  
 Post-Moderated Social Platforms: Administrators of these sites are minimally 
involved in the moderation of its content. As opposed to pre-moderated content, user-
generated content appears online immediately after posting but queued for 
moderation. This level of moderation allows for real-time communication in online 
communities. Eventually, user-generated content deemed inappropriate by site 
moderators is either filtered, hidden or deleted. Post-moderation filters displayed 
posts generated by users, only when deemed “inappropriate” by site administrators. 
On these platforms, users are sometimes allowed to create their topics of discussion 
and contribute to topics created by other users. While these platforms offer flexibility 
as opposed to pre-moderated platforms, they are at risk of accommodating 
inappropriate content if response site moderators do not respond quickly. Examples of 
social networks within these categories include Stack Overflow, Reddit, Stack 
Exchange, Quora [14]. 
 Reactively-Moderated Social Platforms: Administrators of these sites are rarely 
involved in the moderation of, user-generated content. As a result, content appears 
online immediately, and precisely as created. Reactive moderation means site 
moderators rely on users to report inappropriate content when they see it. User-
generated content is therefore only checked if a complaint is made about them by 
other users. Reported posts are removed if deemed necessary by site moderators. This 
level of moderation ensures that users create and engage in topics they want. Users 
with similar ideologies can belong to the same sub-group where they share thoughts 
and beliefs without restrictions.  Users are usually allowed to create their topics of 
discussion, monitor and contribute to topics created by other users. Therefore, these 
types of social platforms encourage highly effective real-time communication with 
minimal restrictions. While these platforms offer flexibility and freedom, they are 
known to be safe havens for cybercriminals. Examples of social platforms in this 
category include Twitter, Facebook, Snap Chat, Tumblr, 4chan [14]. 
Identifying text in online platforms that are relevant to a specific topic of interest is usually 
done with a keyword-based approach [15], [16]. In a keyword-based approach, a set of terms 
are used to filter through text, and only texts containing any word in the set of terms are 
returned [17]. However, with no prior assumptions of context-related keywords, it is useful to 
target forums where users are actively engaged in related topics of interest.   
On real-time microblogging platforms like Twitter and Facebook, a keyword-based approach 
may be appropriate to filter tweets on specific topics or from specific user accounts [18], 
[19]. However, specific users and hashtags that are known to be related to events on the cyber 
domain are also a good source of related discussions. With content-organised platforms like 
Reddit and Stack Overflow, identifying a handful of context-related channels where users are 
actively engaged in relevant types of discussions to have shown to return better samples for 
context analysis [10]. 
Lexicon Building 
The aim of building a lexicon is to extract a set of terms that capture the context of lingual 
analytical interest. From an existing sample of ‘domain-related’ texts, we hope to obtain a set 
of terms that are seen to appear frequently these texts. In addition to the frequency of term 
occurrence, we aim to discriminate terms based on their level of importance and associative 
mutual dependence on other terms in the sentence.  
Typically, when building domain-specific lexicons, two design approaches are considered 
and most often combined: selecting and grouping terms within some predefined categories 
[20] and weighting terms based on the domain of analysis [21] and usefulness of terms to the 
topic of interest [22]. 
The first step in most lexical creation tasks is the candidate terms generation. This step 
involves creating a wordlist or dictionary of terms that are known to appear frequently in 
discussions of interest. Keyword-based extraction of terms is most common in this step and 
has been instrumental to creating traditional lexicons [15], [23] for natural language and 
information retrieval tasks such as sentiment analysis [21]. For example, [24] creates a 
wordlist of positive and negative words for ranking text documents on a scaled range of -1 to 
1 (-1 indicating a strongly negative text document and +1 indicating a strongly positive text 
document). Allahyari et al. [25] apply a similar approach to a multi-class text classification 
task. Similarly, Rose et al. [26] keyword-based approach provide context to the terms used 
for lexical analysis by creating a network of lexical-semantic relations between words in a 
document corpus, where the meaning of each term in the lexicon is defined within the context 
of its relationship with other terms. 
Simple keyword-based candidate term selection approach is further extended to include 
methods for term scoring. For each term that makes it into the candidate set, scoring 
techniques evaluate the importance of that term relative to other terms in the candidate set 
[16] — for example, quantifying the relationship between the terms ‘vulnerability’ and 
‘malware’ in a document set. Popularly in research, terms are numerically scored by two 
main techniques: frequency-based scoring techniques [26]–[28] and scores based on 
associative dependence [22], [29], [30]. Frequency-based scoring techniques rank scores 
based on the number of times they occur within sentences. These methods usually address 
issues with stop words such as ‘I’, ‘is’, ‘then’, ‘that’, ‘have’, ‘has’. – that have no contextual 
meaning but have a high-frequency score due to the nature of their usage in the English 
language. Scoring techniques based on associative dependence further simple frequency-
based scoring to address issues of term importance in the context they occur.  
However, since the basis of most of these term scoring techniques is on semantic 
relationships between words in a text document (independent of externally perceived 
meanings), most of these techniques are blind to the domain of analysis in which they occur. 
For example, consider these two phrases that belong to the same text corpora taken from two 
different subreddits: ‘MySQL Database developer needed urgently for a 2-month project in 
Belfast.’ and ‘New MySQL database vulnerability found on Windows operating system. Yet 
again!!’ Assuming a single domain of analysis, the term ‘database’ in the midst of other 
domain-related terms such as: [‘vulnerability’], [‘operation’ and ‘system’], [‘MySql’], should 
have a higher-ranking score than the same word in the previous phrase. 
This paper aims to develop a lexicon that is usable on most social platforms to automatically 
detect cyber-related messages. The data comprises of a standard set of discussions from 
various social platforms, representative of these cyber-related discussions. 
Data collection and pre-processing 
The datasets used in this study were collected from five social platforms; Twitter 
(twitter.com), Reddit (reddit.com), Stack Overflow (stackoverflow.com), Cyber War News 
(cyberwarnews.info) and The Hacker News (thehackernews.com). These platforms were 
selected as they represent the types of social networks and content generated discussed in this 
paper. 
Twitter represents a self-moderated real-time microblogging platform where users 
communicate uninterrupted and unedited. Twitter is a real-time reactively moderated social 
network platform where moderators rely on users to report content deemed inappropriate. 
Users populate twitter timelines with short (maximum of 140 characters) non-curated posts. 
Hashtags identify tweets on a single topic, ‘@’ represents users involved in a discussion 
thread. Cyber discussions on twitter cover a wide range of cyber event types from individuals 
and groups on cyber hacktivism, cyber warfare, cyber-crimes and cyber terrorism activities. 
Reddit is a collection of minimally moderated sub-forums called subreddits with multiple 
topic threads and comment discussions in each subreddit. Users populate Reddit forums with 
short to medium-length posts and comments. Individuals are allowed to freely start and 
participate in conversations on their topic of interest. Sub-reddits dedicated to cyber 
discussions cover a wide range of cyber-related issues such as cyber-crime, cyber-warfare, 
cyber-hacktivism and cyber-terrorism. 
Stack overflow is a highly-moderated question and answer community with sub-communities 
a wide range of technical content. Questions and answers on stack exchange can be long, 
medium or sometimes short text. Discussion forums are highly moderated, and content is 
filtered based on what forum moderators classify ‘inappropriate’ or ‘irrelevant’ to the forum. 
Cyberwar news is an archive of articles on cyber events. Cyberwar news provides long 
curated, moderated and edited news articles with details on cyber events. Cyber event details 
include details of attackers, details of the victim and technical aspects of the attack. 
Similar to Cyberwar news, the Hacker News is a widely-acknowledged cybersecurity news 
platform, with over 8 million active readers monthly. Readers include IT Professionals, 
academic researchers, hackers and technology experts. The platform features news on the 
latest events in cybersecurity and extensive coverage of current and future trends in 
information security.  
Data Collection 
This work aims to build a lexicon with a set of candidate terms to automatically identify texts 
that are related to the cyber domain. After identifying potential data sources for 
representative cyber-related discussions, we create a generic text corpus that is a collection of 
documents from all data sources. 
 Data Source Social Platform Type Cyber Discussion Type Number of 
Documents 
% Corpus 
1  
 
Question and Answer 
Forum 
Long, Medium or Short, 
Minimally-moderated 
user-generated content. 
190,970 17.8% 
2  
 
Discussion /Community 
Forum 
 333,882 31.2% 
3  
 
Microblogging Site Short  507,348 47.4% 
4  
 
Blog/News Site Long Heavily 
Moderated, Edited 
News-like Articles 
10,568 1% 
5  
 
Blog/News Site Long Heavily 
Moderated, Edited 
News-like Articles 
28,114 2.6% 
 Total Number of 
Documents 
  1,070,882  
Table 1: Data Sources For Lexicon Development 
 
From blogging platforms such as cyberwar news (cyberwarnews.info) and the hacker news 
(thehackernews.com), we collect a total of 1550 cyber event news articles. Each article is 
sentence tokenised, and each sentence is a single document in the final corpus. Cyber news 
articles such as on cyberwar news and hacker news, provide details of cyber events on social 
media such as the name of the operation, target, hacker(s) (if available), date of the event and 
additional social media details. 
To identify relevant users and therefore construct a useful keyword-based filter for Twitter, 
we extract 547 twitter hashtags (189) and mentions (358) from the curated cyber news 
articles collected from cyberwar news and the hacker news. For example, cyber operations on 
Twitter are tagged with the naming convention “#Op[Name of Operation]” (#OpPayback).  
This list of extracted handles, hashtags and mentions are further used as filters to collect 
historical twitter discussions from the 18th of June 2018. Each tweet is also added as a single 
document to the final corpus. 
All user comments on each post from thirty-eight cyber-related subreddits were also gathered 
and processed. Each post and user comment is sentence-tokenised and added as a single 
document to the final corpus. 
Furthermore, questions, answers and posts from ~900 stack exchange question threads with 
at least a thousand (1000) votes were also collected and added to the corpus. Non-text lines 
were excluded from the collection process. 
The search space for data collection in this paper is significantly reduced to only sources of 
cyber-related discussions online. Therefore, tweets, comments and posts from all data sources 
were collected under the assumption of being a post about cyber-related activities. 
Data processing 
We combined tweets, Reddit comments, stack overflow posts and blog articles from 
cyberwar news and hacker news into a single text corpus. We remove duplicate tweets and 
retweets.  We ensure that each data source contributes a significant number of documents to 
the final corpus to achieve an even distribution of document types. A document, represents a 
single tweet, a question, an answer, a sentence, a post or a comment from any of our data 
sources. Long curated articles (text) such as from cyberwar news are split into individual 
sentences, where each sentence is a document in our corpus. Splitting long documents 
ensures that the length of each document in the final corpus remains within a same range of 
word count. 
We use speech tagging to identify and remove entities such as names, places, people, things, 
events and time from each document. Speech tagging splits each document into samples of 
parts-of-speech identification, which act as markers to find people, places, dates, time and 
other related entities. Parts of speech tagging identifies the function a word plays in a 
sentence. Table 2 below shows an example of a document with speech-tagged words. 
“Excerpt from Michael Hastings’ “The Operators” Re: Death Threats http://bit.ly/198uVBl 
#Anonymous #OpIsrael #OpPalestine #Gaza” 
 
SN TERM TAG DESCRIPTION 
1 Excerpt NN Noun Singular Or Mass 
2 From IN Preposition or subordinating conjunction 
3 Michael NNP Proper Noun, Singular 
4 Hastings NNP Proper Noun, Singular 
5 The DT Determiner 
6 Operators NNPS Proper Noun, Plural 
7 death NN Noun, Singular Or Mass 
8 threats NNS Noun, Plural 
9 anonymous JJ Adjective 
10 opIsreal NNP Proper Noun Singular 
11 OpPalestine NNP Proper Noun Singular 
12 Gaza NNP Proper Noun Singular 
Table 2: Sample of Speech-Tagged Tweet 
“Always assume the adversary knows the method, see Kerckhoffs' principle linked in our sidebar.” 
SN TERM TAG DESCRIPTION 
1 Always NNS Noun, Plural 
2 Assume VBP Verb, non-3rd person singular present 
3 The DT Determiner 
4 Adversary NN Noun, singular or mass  
5 Knows VBZ Verb, 3rd person singular present 
6 The DT Determiner 
7 Method NN Noun, singular or mass 
8 See VBP Verb, non-3rd person singular present 
9 Kerchoffs NNP Proper noun, singular 
10 Principle NN Noun, singular or mass 
11 Linked VBD Verb, past tense 
12 in IN Preposition or subordinating conjunction 
 Our PRP$ pronoun, possessive 
 Sidebar NN Noun, singular or mass 
Table 3: Sample of Speech-Tagged Reddit Comment 
We use the compendium of Peen Treebank [31] as a standard for speech tagging terms in our 
corpus. We remove all types of nouns (NN, NNS, NNP, NNPS, POS), all forms of pronouns 
(PRP, PRP$, WP, WP$), prepositions (IN, EX), conjunctions (CC), determiners (DT, PDT, 
WDT), articles (TO, RP) and other unwanted terms (FW, MD, SYM) leaving only verbs, 
adverbs and adjectives. Additionally, we also remove URLs, user mentions, hashtags and 
emotion encodings from each document. Finally, we remove forum specific words from 
corresponding documents. For example, the word “post” from twitter documents, “votes”, 
“upvotes” and “downvotes” from stack overflow documents, the words “subreddit”, “Reddit” 
and “forum” from Reddit documents. 
 
 
Figure 1: Lexicon Development Process 
Building The Lexicon 
Figure 1 above shows the steps involved in developing our generic ‘cyber-related’ lexicon. 
Our process starts by selecting a set of candidate terms for our generic lexicon. Each 
candidate term is assigned three scores; an FDR score, a TF-IDF score and an APMIS score. 
The FDR score represents the term’s frequency of occurrence across all documents in the 
corpus. The TF-IDF score represents the average of the term’s importance across all 
documents in which it occurred. The APMIS score represents the associative dependence of 
the term based on its point-wise mutual information with other terms in the document. 
Finally, a cutoff at the Nth percentile is used to select the Top (k) terms from each scoring 
mechanism. 
Candidate Term Selection 
Our candidate terms are selected based on term frequency, term unigrams and term entropy in 
across all documents. First, each document is term tokenised across the corpus producing a 
unique set of 2,434 initial candidate terms. After term tokenising sentences, we perform an 
initial curation step to remove words that are less than two characters long, greater than 15 
characters and with term entropy of 0. The entropy of terms is estimated using the text 
perfection method described in [32]. We estimate the entropy of each term as 𝑻𝒆𝒓𝒎 𝑬𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒚 =
 −(𝒑 ∗ 𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒑)) where p is the probability of occurrence for each individual character in term, 
estimated as: 
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎
𝑵𝒖𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒊𝒏 𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎
 
Using the term entropy eliminates terms with no substance-for example ‘aaaaa’, ‘ahhhh’, 
‘hahaha’. We also remove text noise in the form of numbers, punctuation and stop words. 
Finally, we stem the remaining words using Porter’s Stemmer [33]. The candidate term 
selection step returns 1149 candidate terms. 
Term Scoring 
Our term scoring strategy is robust in that it includes terms ranked by three different scoring 
mechanisms. In other to ensure a robust lexicon, we rank terms based on their co-occurring 
frequency with other terms, relevance and mutual association with other terms across all 
documents. For each term in our candidate set, we estimate its Term Frequency-Inverse 
Document Frequency (TF-IDF) [34] to measure its relevance, Frequency-Degree Ratio 
(FDR) [26] to quantify its overall co-occurring frequency and Aggregated Pointwise Mutual 
Information Score (APMIS) to estimate its associative dependence. The frequency degree 
ratio scoring ensures that the lexicon includes terms, frequently occurring with other terms. 
Similarly, the Term-Frequency Inverse Document Frequency scoring mechanism ensures that 
the lexicon includes rare but relevant contextual terms. Finally, the Aggregated Pointwise 
Information scoring ensures that the lexicon includes terms with greater informative 
association with other terms across documents. 
The term scoring mechanisms used in this paper starts with an initial estimation of a term-
document matrix. A term-document matrix, 𝒕𝒇𝒕,𝒅  is a sparse matrix representation of the 
terms’ weights in each document in the corpus [22].We start by creating the term-document 
matrix 𝒕𝒇𝒕,𝒅 , where each row is a document d, each column is a term t and each cell 
represents the number of times the term t occurs in the document d. Note that the columns in 
a term-document matrix represent terms across all documents in the corpus, therefore 
creating a highly sparse matrix representation of term weightings of zeros across documents. 
To address the sparsity of the term-document matrix, we remove terms that only appear in at 
least 90% of documents in the combined corpus. 
Term-Frequency Inverse Document Matrix (TF-IDF Score) 
While term frequency of a term t refers to the number of occurrences of the term t across all 
documents in the corpus, the document frequency of a term t, refers to the number of 
documents in which t occurs. Dividing the term-frequency of each term by its corresponding 
document frequency produces a matrix that is directly proportional to the frequency of 
occurrence of each term in a document but inversely proportional to the number of 
documents it occurs. The inverse document frequency score diminishes the weights of 
frequently occurring terms and increases the weights of terms that occur rarely.  The term-
frequency inverse document frequency of terms, therefore, assigns weights to terms that 
signify their quantified relevance in documents.  The Inverse Document Frequency (IDF) 
[35] is estimated as: 
𝒊𝒅𝒇𝒕 = 𝒍𝒐𝒈(
𝑵
𝒅𝒇𝒕
) 
We, therefore, estimate the term-frequency inverse-document frequency score (TF-IDF 
score) for each term as a product of the term frequencies and the inverse document 
frequency. 
𝑻𝑭𝒕,𝒅𝒊𝒅𝒇𝒕 = (𝑻𝑭𝒕,𝒅)(𝒍𝒐𝒈 (
𝑵
𝒅𝒇𝒕
)) 
Where the total term-frequency of each term ( 𝑻𝑭𝒕,𝒅) is estimated as the sum of raw counts of 
a term t in each document d divided by the total number of terms in d. 
Frequency Degree Ratio (FDR Score) 
The summed term frequency, freq(t), refers to the number of times each term appears across 
all documents while term degree is a measure of co-occurrence of each term with other terms 
across all documents in a given corpus [26].  The term degree is a term-term first-order co-
occurrence matrix [36] 𝒕𝒕𝒕,𝒕  which represents the number of times a term 𝒕𝒊  occurs with 
another term  𝒕𝒋 within the same context across all documents in the corpus. Co-occurrence 
expresses links of relationships between texts, therefore acting as an indicator of cohesion 
between individual terms in a document [37]. In a co-occurrence matrix or term-term matrix, 
each term is represented as a numeric vector of the number of occurrences with other terms. 
Each term in our candidate set is represented as a potential context term. Our co-occurrence 
matrix is an |𝑴| 𝑿 |𝑴|  matrix where M = number of terms in the candidate set. The summed 
term degree, degree(t), is the sum of term-term co-occurrence of term t with all other 
candidate terms. The term degree, therefore, measures the importance of each term in a 
document relative to other documents in the entire corpus. 
For the Frequency-degree ratio scoring, each term in the resulting candidate set is initially 
weighted on these two basic scores: the summed term frequency and the summed term degree 
of terms. Note that our measure of term degree, degree(t) subtracts the number of self-term 
co-occurrence (i.e. the number of times a term co-occurs with itself) from the summed total 
of term degree (by equating the diagonals of the term-term matrix M to 0). Similarly, we 
normalise our measure of term frequency of each term with the total number of terms in the 
corresponding document. The ratio of term frequency to term degree 
𝒅𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒆 (𝒕)
𝒇𝒓𝒆𝒒(𝒕)
 for each term 
in our candidate set is estimated to give the FDR term score. 
Aggregated Pointwise Information Score 
Frequency-based algorithms, however, are not the best measures for associations between 
terms as they are not very discriminative to terms with a superior level of relevance given the 
context of analysis. To extract a measure for the degree of context shared between individual 
pairs of terms, we replace the frequency with the pointwise mutual information score 
between the two terms. We estimate the informative dependence between two terms as their 
pointwise mutual information. The pointwise mutual information between two terms 
𝒕𝟏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝒕𝟐 measures the amount of informative association between them [38] i.e. the 
probability of observing a term 𝒕𝟏 with another term 𝒕𝟐  as opposed to observing them 
independently. In its simplest application, a set of terms in a candidate set is measured against 
a set of ‘context-terms’, usually representing a given context of analysis. It can also be 
described as the logged independent joint probability of occurrence between 𝒕𝟏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝒕𝟐. The 
PMI between two terms 𝒕𝟏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝒕𝟐 is estimated as: 
𝑷𝑴𝑰(𝒕𝟏, 𝒕𝟐) = 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝟐 (
𝑷(𝒕𝟏, 𝒕𝟐)
𝑷(𝒕𝟏)𝑷(𝒕𝟐)
) 
We use our candidate terms as context terms for analysis. Therefore, our PMI Matrix is a 
term-term representation of the pointwise mutual information between each pair of candidate 
terms. The PMI estimate ranges from -∞ to +∞. To compute the PMI matrix from a term-
term matrix M with n rows (terms) and n columns (context-terms; candidate terms in our 
case), we estimate each cell as: 
𝒑𝒎𝒊𝒊𝒋 =  𝒍𝒐𝒈𝟐 (
𝒑𝒊𝒋
𝒑𝒊 ∗  𝒑𝒋
) 
The pointwise mutual information (PMI) matrix shows the PMI score for each ‘term-term’ 
combination of terms in our candidate set. For example, given the term-term matrix below, 
the aggregated sum of co-occurrence of the term ‘attack’ with all other terms in the matrix is 
3182. Similarly, the aggregated sum of co-occurrence of the term ‘target’ with all other terms 
in the matrix is 1398. 
 
Figure 2: Term-term Matrix with term-term co-occurrence scores 
If the sum of the ‘term-term’ matrix is 8182, we can estimate the PMI between the term 
“attack” and the context-term “target” as: 
𝑷𝑴𝑰𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌,𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒕 =  𝒍𝒐𝒈𝟐  (
𝒑(𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌, 𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒕)
𝒑(𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌) ∗ 𝒑(𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒕)
) 
Where “attack” is the term and “target” is the context term. 
 
P(attack) = 3182/8182 = 0.39 
P(target) = 1398/8182 = 0.17 
P(attack, target) = 731/8182 = 0.09 
𝑷𝑴𝑰𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌,𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒕 =  𝒍𝒐𝒈𝟐  (
𝟎. 𝟎𝟗
𝟎. 𝟑𝟗 ∗ 𝟎. 𝟏𝟕
) 
Therefore, there is a 14% probability of observing the terms ‘attack’ and ‘target’ together in 
the document corpus. Estimating this value for each term-term (context) combination 
produces the figures shown below. 
 
Figure 3: Term-term Matrix with term-term co-occurrence PMI Scores 
The PMI scores for term-based analysis is known to be discriminative to infrequent terms 
where infrequent terms have very high PMI values [22]. Jurasky & Martin proposes two 
solutions to this problem: a) higher probability assignments by raising context-term 
probabilities to =0.75 and b) using the Laplace [add-2] smoothed values of the co-
occurrence matrix. Therefore, the Aggregated Pointwise Mutual Information Score (APMIS) 
for each term is the simple sum of PMI scores of a single term with all context-terms. For 
example, using the figure above, 
𝑨𝑷𝑴𝑰𝑺𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎 + 𝟎. 𝟗𝟐𝟓 + 𝟎. 𝟒𝟎𝟏 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟒𝟗 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟔𝟗 − 𝟎. 𝟔𝟑𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟕𝟔 
Therefore, there is a 57% probability of observing the term ‘attack’ with other terms in the 
matrix in figure 3 above.  
Finally, the table below shows the top 20 cyber-related terms using each of the scoring 
criteria. 
SN TF-IDF FDR APMIS 
1.  http administr actual 
2.  enter agenc allow 
3.  run action account 
4.  data analyz back 
5.  free amount activ 
6.  find aim address 
7.  window breach addit 
8.  actual access access 
9.  differ aspect app 
10.  file account basic 
11.  user address assum 
12.  call autom base 
13.  prize applic avail 
14.  ticket attempt applic 
15.  open attack appear 
16.  chang capabl attack 
17.  read admin affect 
18.  creat advis android 
19.  start associ anonym 
20.  key alert break 
Table 4: Top 20 Terms (FDR, TF-IDF, APMIS Scoring). 
The difference in term ranks for each scoring mechanism, in summary, the FDR word score 
favours frequently co-occurring terms, the TF-IDF score will favour useful terms that often 
occur across documents while the APMIS will favour terms with greater association and 
dependence with other terms across documents. 
 Term Curation And Top-terms Selection 
The curation steps further remove unwanted terms to yield better-filtered results. We also 
remove terms contextually associated with specific cyber events, users, Reddit forums and 
hashtags. For example, terms such as the name of Reddit forums or twitter usernames and 
handles. Additionally, names of specific cyber events on Twitter such as tagged cyber 
operations e.g. #OpPayback or specific users such as @anonr00t were removed from the 
resulting word list. After candidate terms have been selected, we select terms whose term 
scores meets an optimal threshold K. 'K' represents a threshold of terms scores for including 
corresponding terms in the lexicon. 
 Figure 4: Distribution of Term Scores 
Terms Score Cutoff Selection 
We determine the cutoff 'K' by observing the changes in the term scores at various percentiles 
as shown in figure 4. Figure 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) plot the density distribution of term scores. 
The red lines indicate the cutoff percentile at which there is at least an increase twice as much 
as the previous increase. The right-skewed distributions show that about 10% (above the 90th 
percentile) of all terms from each scoring mechanism meet the threshold.  
 
Figure 5: Term Score Cut-offs 
Additionally, as seen in table 3 above, the terms whose scores meet the 90th percentile cutoff, 
returned by each scoring mechanism significantly contain terms that are representative of 
specific cyber event categories [39]. For example, the Top(K) terms for the term frequency – 
term degree ratio returns terms that are characteristic of cybercrimes while the Top(K) terms 
for APMIS returns terms that are characteristic of cyber warfare and cyber espionage. To get 
a representative sample of terms that characterise various types of cyber incidents, we include 
all terms whose scores meet the optimal cutoff in the lexicon. 
𝑪𝒖𝒕𝒐𝒇𝒇(𝑲)𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒄 𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆, 𝑪𝒖𝒕𝒐𝒇𝒇(𝑲)𝑻𝑭−𝑰𝑫𝑭 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑪𝒖𝒕𝒐𝒇𝒇(𝑲)𝑨𝑷𝑴𝑰𝑺. 
In the end, this cyber lexicon should be able to track various types of cyber-related 
discussions on social platforms. The application of this lexicon depends on the kind of 
analysis conducted. For example, the lexicon can be used in quantifying a random text to 
estimate its degree of cyber-relatedness or used in querying and tracking discussions on 
social forums. The final Cyber Lexicon is a set of 217 terms with their corresponding term 
scores for each scoring criteria. 
Evaluating The Lexicon 
To test the real-world application of our generic cyber lexicon, we create a new text corpus 
with documents collected from various social media platforms and measure the degree of 
‘cyber-relatedness’ of documents in the corpus. Social media platforms included in the test 
sample cases include some of and more social media platforms included in the corpus used in 
developing the lexicon. We start off by building the sample text corpus of cyber and non-
cyber related documents (texts) obtained from the web and apply our generic lexicon to each 
document in the corpus. The sources for our test corpus collection are based on a 
representative sample of all types of cyber-related discussions on various social platforms. 
The table below shows the data sources, amount of cyber-related and non-cyber-related texts 
collected for our test text corpus. 
 
 Data Source Social Platform Type Number of 
Cyber-related 
Texts 
Number of 
Non-Cyber-
related 
Texts 
Number 
of 
Docume
nts 
% of 
Test 
Corpus 
1  
 
News Site (Long edited articles) 15 15 30 13.7% 
2 
 
Microblogging Comments 
(Short – Medium minimally 
moderated user comments) 
15 13 28 12.8% 
3  
 
Blogging/News Site (Long 
edited articles) 
14 0 14 6.4% 
4 
 
Microblogging Comments 
(Short – Medium minimally 
moderated user comments) 
15 14 29 13.3% 
5  
 
Discussion Forum 15 15 30 13.7% 
6 
 
Discussion Forum 15 15 30 13.7% 
7 
 
Question and Answer Forum 14 14 28 12.8% 
8  Blogging Comments (Short – 
Medium minimally moderated 
user comments) 
14 15 29 13.3% 
 TOTAL  117 101 218 ≈ 100% 
Table 5: Data Sources for Evaluation Data 
Evaluation Strategy 
For each data source identified in the table above, we collect a set of ‘cyber-related’ texts and 
non-cyber-related texts. Cyber-related texts were collected from comments in forums or 
sections tagged as being related to cyber-attacks or incidents. The non-cyber-related text was 
collected from random sections of forums such as fashion, entertainment, economy, finance 
etc. All posts under cyber-related topics were labelled as ‘cyber’ (or 1), and all posts on other 
topics were labelled as ‘non-cyber’ (or 0). A total of 117 cyber-related and 101 non-cyber-
related texts were collected from 8 social platforms-as shown in table 7- to create the test 
corpus. Each document in the corpus is then assigned to one of two classes: a) Cyber-related 
and b) Non-Cyber-Related. Note that there is a fairly balanced number of documents 
assigned to each class. 
To calculate the degree of cyber-relatedness of a document, we rely on a bag-of-words-based 
algorithm that is a function of the document’s terms and terms in the cyber lexicon. For this 
evaluation, our estimate of the ‘cyber-relatedness’ of a given text is a measure of the summed 
APMIS scores of individuals words in the text matched to terms in our generic lexicon. The 
APMIS scores in the lexicon are re-scaled on a scale of 0 through 100. The cyber-relatedness 
of text is estimated as the average of the APMIS scores of all cyber-related terms in the given 
text. 
Given that all APMIS term scores are within a range of  0 through 100, the expected estimate 
for the cyber-relatedness of any given text should also be on a similar scale. Therefore, these 
estimates can be represented as a percentage. Note that each word in a text is scored 
regardless of its frequency of occurrence; therefore, a word W with a word frequency of 3 
will add (𝑾𝒂𝒑𝒎𝒊𝒔) ∗ 𝟑   to the total text score. 
Given a random text or sentence and our generic lexicon with corresponding term scores, the 
‘cyber-relatedness’ is measured by the ‘Cyber-Relatedness’ algorithm as presented below: 
Pseudo-Code: Estimating the Cyber-Relatedness (CR) of  a Random Text 
Input: L < Cyber Lexicon [Term: Score] >, S < A Random Text or Sentence >    
Output: CR < Numeric Quantity for the Cyber-relatedness of S >  
1: set match = 0;                                                                                                 << (a) 
2: set sum_scores = 0; << (b) 
3: set words = SentenceTokenise(S);  
4: set wordcount = length(words); << (c) 
5:             For each word in words:  
6:                          If word in L.Terms:  
7:                                     set sum_scores = sum_scores + L.Term.Score   
8:                                      set match = match+1  
9:                           End  
10:             End  
11: set scalar =  match ÷ wordcount  << (d) 
12: set CR =  sum_scores * scalar  
13: return CR  
Table 6: Pseudocode-Estimating Cyber-Relatedness of a Random Text 
The pseudocode above demonstrates the steps taken to quantify the degree of cyber-
relatedness for a text or sentence. The expected output is a numeric quantity of how ‘cyber-
related’ the sentence is. The Pseudocode above has two inputs: a) a cyber lexicon with cyber-
related terms and respective term scores and b) a sentence of which is to be quantified. The 
pseudocode has four case points:  
a) match: this tracks the number of words in sentence matched to terms in cyber lexicon,  
b) sum_scores: this tracks the sum of term scores for matched terms,  
c) wordcount: this is the number of words in the given sentence,  
d) scalar: this scales the total matches found by the total number of words in the 
sentence.   
The process splits the sentence into single words and searches the lexicon for a match on 
each word. It sums up the term scores of each matched term and scales it by a scalar quantity. 
The final CR score is a sum of the term scores scaled by the scalar quantity.  
Classifying Documents 
Document classification is the task of grouping documents in our test corpus as ‘cyber-
related’ or ‘non-cyber-related’ based on their content. The content of each document is 
assumed to contain words that match terms in our generic lexicon, and we estimate the 
percentage degree of cyber-relatedness as a function of matched terms scores and the 
frequency of occurrence of each matched term. After pre-processing each document, using 
the algorithm above, we estimate the degree of cyber-relatedness of each test in the new 
sample set. After re-scaling the term scores, the expected estimate for the ‘cyber-relatedness’ 
of each text returns a percentage with a value between 0 and 100. These percentages, 
however, do not represent the probabilities of documents belonging to either of the two 
classes- ‘Cyber-related’ and ‘Non-Cyber-Related’. Classifying each document given its 
percentage degree of ‘cyber-relatedness’ is treated here as a two-class classification (binary 
classification) task in a supervised learning environment. The true class for each document is 
the assigned classes (‘Cyber-related’ or ‘Non-Cyber-Related’) from the previous document 
labelling phase. 
Applying our algorithm to each document in our text corpus produces a numeric vector of 
percentage ‘cyber-relatedness’ ranging from 0 through 100. Therefore, the classifier 
boundary (a threshold) between the two identified classes must be determined by a threshold. 
To select an optimal classification threshold, we use the ‘Receiver Operating Characteristic’ 
curve (ROC) analysis [40]. Typically, the ROC curve is created by plotting the recall or 
sensitivity against the false positive rate given a set of estimated and actual values. 
 
 Figure 6: Receiver Operating Curve 
We select a threshold value that maximises the ‘area under the ROC curve' [40] as the 
optimal boundary for our classification task. The intersection of the two red lines in the figure 
above indicates the optimal value (0.19) for a threshold. A threshold of 0.19 maximises the 
probability (0.77) that our algorithm will score a randomly selected cyber-related document 
higher than a randomly chosen non-cyber-related document. 
We create a confusion matrix from comparing our predicted classes produced by applying the 
lexicon and the actual classes of each document. The confusion matrix in the table below 
shows the number of Cyber-related documents our generic lexicon correctly classifies as 
‘Cyber-related’ (𝑇𝑃𝑠), the number of Cyber-related documents it incorrectly classifies as 
‘Non-Cyber-Related’ (𝐹𝑁𝑠),,  the number of ‘Non-Cyber-related’ documents it correctly 
classifies as ‘Non-Cyber-Related’ (𝑇𝑁𝑠) ,  and the number of ‘Non-Cyber-Related’ 
documents it incorrectly classifies as ‘Cyber-related’ (𝐹𝑃𝑠),. 
FDR Scoring 
Cyber 31 (TP) 80 (FP) 
Non-Cyber 5 (FN) 96 (TN) 
TF-IDF Scoring 
Cyber 79 (TP) 32 (FP) 
Non-Cyber 48 (FN) 53 (TN) 
APMIS Scoring 
Cyber 86 (TP) 25 (FP) 
Non-Cyber 63 (FN) 38 (TN) 
Table 7: Score Performance Comparison 
Table 5 above shows the performance of term weights for each scoring mechanism in 
correctly identifying cyber-related discussions. Each confusion matrix above is an nXn 
matrix tool used for performance evaluation. The diagonals of the confusion (𝑇𝑃𝑠)  and 
(𝑇𝑁𝑠), represent the total number of documents our generic lexicon correctly classifies. On 
the other hand, the off-diagonals of the confusion matrix, (𝐹𝑁𝑠), and (𝐹𝑃𝑠), , represents the 
total number of documents our generic lexicon incorrectly classifies. 
The term scores of the frequency-degree ratio scoring are seen to maximize the ability to 
correctly identify non-cyber related documents while also minimizing the probability of 
classifying a cyber-related document as non-cyber related. On the other hand, the terms 
weights from the APMIS scoring algorithms are seen to maximize the ability of the lexicon to 
correctly identify all cyber-related documents but minimally truly identifies all non-cyber 
related documents. 
We determine various performance evaluation metrics from the confusion matrices above. 
The set of metrics we estimate are the Error rate, Performance accuracy, Precision, Recall 
and the F1 Score.  
 FDR Scores TF-IDF APMIS Scores 
Precision 85% 61% 58% 
Recall 31% 72% 78% 
Accuracy 61% 62% 60% 
F1 Score 46% 66% 67% 
Error Rate 38% 38% 40% 
Table 8: Performance Evaluation 
Table 6 above is a cross evaluation table of the lexicon using each scoring criteria. The 
APMIS scores are seen to maximize the ability of the lexicon to correctly identify all cyber-
related texts with an acceptable error level. The APMIS score is also seen to provide a model 
with an optimal balance of identifying positive cases and ignoring non-positive cases by 
maximizing the F1 score. 
Conclusion 
This paper describes a methodology for creating a generic lexicon that captures the analytical 
context of the cyber domain. Our method produces an effective generic cyber lexicon of 745 
terms based on their TF-IDF, FDR and APMIS scores within the sample data used in this 
study. Our generic lexicon classifies random documents using a frequency-based algorithm 
with an accuracy of approximately 80%. Our results are based on a balanced representation 
of all types of cyber-related discussions in online social platforms. In its generalist form, this 
study provides researchers and cyber analysts with an integrated approach for detecting 
‘cyber-related’ discussions in online platforms. However, there are extensive theoretical and 
practical impacts of this study. Firstly, the theoretical methodology outlined in this study can 
be applied to develop custom cyber-lexicons based on different evidence sources or social 
platforms. The methodology can be used in a combination of various social platforms to 
extract keywords that capture the context of cyber discussions taking place on these 
platforms. Likewise, the generic lexicon provided in this study can be applied to some 
information retrieval tasks on social platforms. The terms in our generic lexicon can be used 
as filters for sampling cyber-related documents or discussions. Lastly, the results of this study 
can be used to monitor cyber activities online. This study is also useful for cyber analysts to 
detect malicious cyber activities and detect early warning signs of cyber threats on social 
platforms. To further this study, cyber analysts are usually interested in identifying keywords 
on social platforms that characterise the proliferation of various types of cyber events. We are 
currently working on classifying filtered ‘cyber-related’ discussions from online platforms 
based on the classifications of cyber incidents presented by Hathaway [39]. 
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